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DOES THE PRESENT TRAINING PROGRAM
PREPARE THE INFANTRYMAN ADEQUATELY
FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH ARMOR?

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Roster NR 131

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PREFACE

17 September 1958

The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author - not necessarily that of the United States Army Infantry School or the United States Army.

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INTRODUCTION

The Infantryman is the cutting edge of the sword of military might. The Infantryman is called upon, in time of war with an armed enemy, to fight a very personal war with the enemy's foot soldier. He meets the enemy at very close ranges, often hand to hand. His primary mission is the total destruction of the enemy he opposes.

To accomplish this mission he is supported by all of the weapons and special units needed to assist him in completing the task. Among the supporting weapons and supporting units which this Infantryman has is the tank. With this tank the Infantryman is capable of accomplishments that otherwise might be impossible. For example, attack an enemy force entrenched in strong positions and supported by their own tanks. Normally it is considered that the best weapon against a tank is another tank. Consequently, because the Infantryman needs this tank, he must learn to work with it, fight with it and win with it. This can only be accomplished by adequate training.

It is the purpose of this paper to look at the training which our Infantry receives with tanks, to analyze this particular training, and to determine if this training is adequate. It is not the intention of the author to discuss the relative merits of the Armor Branch or to argue if the tank is a weapon of the past or the future. It is assumed that armor is an integral part of our military machine and

as such is to play a very major role in any future war. The term Infantryman is not limited in definition to the enlisted soldier in the Infantry, but includes his officers.

The term present training program as included in the subject of this monograph is construed to mean the training programs designed to train the basic Infantry soldier from time of induction through completion of the maneuver or testing phase of unit training. Additionally, it is realized that each Army area programs training for its organic units and this is frequently scheduled by the installation commander. This training involves TOE units which are not involved in elementary training. This training is often called Post Cycle Training and is to be considered when analyzing the various training programs.

The introduction of atomic weapons to the battlefield of the future has caused many changes in our military doctrine and even organization. Its effects cannot be overlooked and have been considered within the scope of this paper.

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DISCUSSION

During World War II, on an island named Luzon, a battalion of Infantry was preparing for an attack. A very short time before the battalion was to make this attack a tank platoon leader reported to the battalion commander that he was attached for the operation. There was not sufficient time for any lengthy coordination between the battalion commander and the tank platoon leader. The colonel was not familiar with tanks to any high degree and did not know from his own experience and training the best method of employment of this attached platoon of tanks. So, with the usual question, "What can you do for me?", the two officers made hasty plans for the employment of the tank platoon. When the attack commenced the tanks were late in crossing the line of departure, the colonel felt that they were drawing more fire than they were delivering, and in general he was displeased with the performance of the tank platoon. Consequently, he ordered the platoon leader to get himself and his tanks out of the area immediately and never come back. This Infantry commander felt, as do most who do not understand what armor can do, or what its problems are, that his unit was better off without the tanks. Later this same battalion commander made a statement that "I learned with experience and a little patience that getting to know tankers and their problems as well as artillerymen and their problems increase the effectiveness of the team."(9:9) It is easily seen that combined training be-

ANNEX B - LETTER FROM COMMANDING GENERAL, 82nd AIRBORNE
DIVISION, FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA.

HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

9 August 1958

Dear Robertson:

I am glad to have a try at answering your questions, although they are not ones on which I have strong convictions.

1. I don't feel that the Army is going far enough in its tactical doctrine, nor in its organization, in facing up to the effects of the atomic weapon. I believe a small select, mobile and elusive group, with communications permitting it to call for fire support, will in an atomic battlefield be militarily stronger than a more ponderous force. On the other hand, I don't know why the use of atomics will have much bearing on the integration of armor into the infantry defensive position. I lean towards the idea of an Army composed of air cavalry, artillery and armored units, the latter most emphatically to include armor infantry. My philosophy on this matter may be garnered by reading the inclosure.

2. I can't answer this very well. In this division we do not have sufficient training with the tank battalion on this post, but on the other hand that training is not so essential to an airborne division as to a leg infantry division.

3. I should say the airborne, as opposed to regular infantry, is more qualified to do practically any battle task by reason of the fact that our soldier is by and large a heartier soul and in better physical condition. I will say that any infantry suddenly called upon to fight in close coordination with armor will suffer seriously for lack of previous training - and so will the tanks.

Best personal wishes,

/s/Hamilton H. Howze
/t/HAMILTON H. HOWZE
Major General, USA
Commanding

(Author's Note: Extracts of this letter may not be made without the expressed approval of the author of this monograph).

fore combat would have eliminated possibly all of the problems that arose in the situation just described. It would at least have given the battalion commander some idea of how to employ the armor to valuably assist him in accomplishing his mission. In an article written by this commander, Lieutenant Colonel Eben F. Swift, Colonel Swift made the following remarks: "I would like to be sure that when I, an Infantryman in the era of push-button warfare, find myself in a hotspot, as usual, and an officer reports to me saying, 'Sir, I am Lieutenant Smith of the 999th Guided Missiles Battalion. Here is your automatic synchronized electronic activator. What do you want me to do with it?' - I would like to be sure that I was trained beforehand not to push the wrong button."(9:9)

Colonel Swift strongly felt that there was a dire need for more and more training with armor in order to learn useful employment. Back in 1948, at the time he wrote his article for the Infantry Journal, Colonel Swift concluded that the "organization of the new Infantry division with tank companies in the regiment, and tank battalions integral within the division will go a long way toward providing the opportunity for this training."(9:9) However, today the only tanks found in the new regiment, the Infantry battle group, are the ones in the Reconnaissance Platoon and as an interim weapon in the Assault Gun Platoon. The mission of this little segment of armored might is entirely different from that of normal armor and the Infantryman of the battle group is usually denied the opportunity to train with these particular tanks unless, of course, he is a member of these platoons.

Despite the knowledge we gained from World War II, we entered into the Korean War in relatively the same state of

with the general contents of the present training programs under which our Infantry units train today. Tell me, what do you think of these programs insofar as the time allotted to tank and Infantry training as a combined team is concerned?

Ans: I think there is a definite lack of interest and effort put into tank-infantry training today. As I recall, I never did train with any armor at night nor with them in the defense. I don't believe that the training programs provide or require enough time for Infantrymen to work with tanks and learn to use them.

I believe that tankers would like to work with us because they know that they need us for their close protection.

I personally feel that more training should be conducted with tanks to enable the NCO's and their officers to know how to operate with tanks in combat. Right now, I don't believe they do.

Another type of training with the tanks which is neglected is the role of Infantry with tanks employed in riot control. Any unit may be called on to handle a riot at any time, and there is no reason for the unit not to be ready.

I have examined the above interview and find it to be an accurate account of an interview conducted on 6 September 1958.

Stanley T. Adams
STANLEY T. ADAMS
Captain, Infantry

(Author's Note: Captain Stanley T. Adams is a holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor which he won in Korea while a member of the 19th Infantry, 24th Division.)

preparedness insofar as the Infantryman's knowledge of the employment of armor and his ability to use it was concerned. In a recent interview with Captain Stanley T. Adams, holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor and a veteran of World War II and the Korean War, Captain Adams made it quite clear that he did not feel that we were any better prepared to use tanks in the Korean War than we were initially in World War II. (1:1) It was his experience that the small unit commanders did not know enough on the control and employment of tanks to be able to efficiently utilize them in combat. It is his opinion that today commanders are not interested in going out of their way to train their units to become proficient in the utilization of armor. An interesting note is that Captain Adams mentioned the tank-infantry training for riot control. He feels that any unit may be called upon to quell a riot and that it should certainly be ready. He feels that the training programs neglect this particular phase also. Captain Adams indicated that he does not believe that our current training programs are geared to developing the necessary proficiency of the tank-infantry team. Certainly as wars progress and our men continue to operate with tanks they learn to obtain the most from this team and become an efficient fighting force. Why must we wait until we are engaged in war with a real enemy, shooting real bullets, and sustaining real casualties before we suddenly become aware that we have neglected training our men in this particular area?

Just what training does our Infantry soldier have in conjunction with tanks? The enlisted Infantryman is first introduced to tanks under ATP 7-200, Army Training Program for Infantry Rifle Company and Airborne Infantry Rifle Company. The soldier has completed approximately twenty

ANNEX A - INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN STANLEY T. ADAMS, ADVANCE
3, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA.

Ques: Captain Adams, how much service have you?

Ans: Sixteen years total with seven as a commissioned officer.

Ques: Have you ever commanded an Infantry rifle company, and if so where and when?

Ans: Yes, I did. I commanded a company of the 3rd Regiment from January 1957 through March 1958.

Ques: In your experiences as a rifle company commander in garrison did you ever train with tanks?

Ans: Only on two occasions. Once was in a normal cycle ATP and the other time was in training for riot control. The cycle training was directed by regiment and company commanders wrote their own problems. The training was rather limited.

Ques: While serving in Korea did you ever have the occasion to fight along with tanks?

Ans: Only once during a withdrawal and we were mostly riding them at that time.

Ques: Do you feel that you and your men were qualified to fight with them upon first meeting?

Ans: I was familiar with employing them due to my experience with tanks in World War II. I have great confidence in them and like to employ them. However, many commanders of units of my regiment did not know how to employ them and to control them.

Ques: Captain Adams, I believe that you are familiar

weeks of training by the time he meets the tanks and is in the platoon phase of basic unit training. Now he is taught the role "of tanks with infantry; mutual support with the infantry-tank team; composition, command, control, and communications of the infantry-tank team; methods of attack, conduct of the attack, and reorganization and preparation for continuation of the attack; a field exercise involving a rifle platoon operating with a platoon of tanks to bring out the principles of the small infantry-tank team in attack. Communications between tank and infantry elements will be stressed."(2:44,45) For this training ATP 7-200 authorizes eight hours. Approximately three weeks later while in the company phase, the soldier receives six hours more of infantry-tank team in attack. The only difference between this training and that given previously is that the exercise involves the entire company and includes the breaching of an anti-tank minefield.(2:50) Note that all of the training mentioned here is limited to the offense, and although it is dependent upon the individual commander, it is not required that any training be conducted at night. There is no requirement that simulated conditions of atomic warfare exist.

Although ATP 7-200 includes the rifle company of the airborne division, current TOE's exclude all tanks from the airborne division. Each Infantry division has one tank battalion organic to its organization, and these tanks are quite infrequently furnished to the battle groups for training with the Infantry. The airborne division must arrange with an armored unit, if available, for tanks to be provided to the division to enable its Infantry to receive combined training. Obviously in this last situation tanks are not always available since the training missions of the

CONCLUSION

After consideration of the research material as presented within this monograph, and additional reading not herewith mentioned, it is the opinion of the author that the present training program of the United States Army does not prepare the Infantryman adequately for combined operations with armor. This opinion is predicated upon the following conclusions:

1. Training of Infantry with tanks is most often limited to offensive maneuvers or employment.

2. Although it is dependent upon the individual commander, training is most often limited to hours of daylight.

3. Infantry units have very little opportunity to train with tank units over a prolonged period so that the Infantryman might be made aware of the problems which confront the armored units. For example, problems such as the logistical and maintenance requirements which burden tank units.

4. The effects on tanks of atomic battlefield conditions is not presented to the Infantryman so that he might appreciate the position of the armored unit on the battlefield.

5. The major cause of the lack of sufficient training under the conditions listed above is that current training programs do not allot Infantry units adequate amounts of time for combined training.

two units are not coordinated to mutually support one another. When an infantry battle group is preparing for its annual training test, a company of tanks is provided from the tank battalion. The tanks are utilized during any pre-test training or rehearsals conducted. Tanks are utilized during the conduct of the training test, but after completion they are returned to the control of their parent organization. It will be many months before the tanks will again be employed in training exercises, if then. In an airborne division, seldom if ever are tanks provided for training. They are not employed in the conduct of the airborne battle group annual training test. In reply to a letter written to Major General Hamilton H. Howze, Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division, General Howze had the following to say: "In this division we do not have sufficient training with the tank battalion on this post, but on the other hand that training is not so essential to an airborne division as to a leg infantry division."(3) He continued by stating "that any infantry suddenly called upon to fight in close coordination with armor will suffer seriously for lack of previous training - and so will the tanks."(3)

As has been pointed out previously, tank-infantry training under the elementary Army Training Program is limited to offensive employment. Only when conducting training tests and sustained advanced unit training are Infantry units apt to utilize them in the defense. New battlefield tactical concepts envision Infantry units in an ever-increasing role of mobile defense. Because of lethal effects of the modern atomic weapons, a unit will not be able to maintain the offense at his own discretion. Enemies may constantly revert from the offense to the defense and back again to the offense in order to gain the advantage over the enemy in

The degree of control and close coordination will spell success or failure of such an operation. Obviously, only by continuous integrated training will this be achieved. If the present training program prepares the Infantryman adequately for combined operations with armor, why is it virtually impossible to find a favorable indorsement of the training program as it now stands?

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There will be more occasions when they will be than when they will not. Infantry needs tanks and tanks need Infantry. When a rifle unit has the mission of flank guard, advance guard, rear guard or outpost guard, it requires armor support. Tanks are frequently needed in the attack, the defense and the withdrawal. Each of these are a different operation and requires specific knowledge of that particular type operation. Conducting these operations with armor should be the rule rather than the exception.

For the past six years the author has served in TOE, combat-ready units. Approximately two and one-half years were spent as a company commander of Infantry units. During this time the author has trained several groups of Advanced Individual Trainees, completed several Post Cycle Training periods including maneuvers, and has participated in numerous field exercises. During all of this time, training conducted with any armor was done only a few times. When tanks were available with which to train, they were generally allowed to remain with the Infantry unit only a few hours. Each time the tanks were employed there were many errors made, but the training schedules did not permit enough time to repeat the exercise or problem and to profit by the initial mistakes. Never once was a platoon or even a section of tanks attached to the company for one of its Army Training Tests. Yet when the battalion test was taken, a platoon of tanks was attached for one or more of the three mandatory phases: the defense, night withdrawal and the daylight attack. In retrospect it seems incredible that more training with armor was not conducted.

To repeat this theme again, both tanks and Infantry must understand each other's capabilities and limitations if they are to be able to conduct a combined operation.

employing the atomic arsenals. R. M. Ogorkiewicz in an article titled, "The Evolution of Armored Tactics," commented that for "many years it has been customary to describe armored units as offensive in character and, by implication, to rule out defensive missions. This outlook was inspired largely by the conception of defense as static rather than dynamic, aimed at holding a particular piece of ground rather than inflicting a maximum of casualties on the enemy and wresting the initiative from him. From the latter point of view armored units are well-suited to defense. This is particularly true in light of the destructive power of modern weapons which puts a premium on the ability to keep the situation fluid and where prolonged static defense runs the risk of total annihilation. Thus it is unnecessarily restrictive to describe armored forces as only offensive and far better to define them as mobile."(5:31)

Experiences from World War II and Korea point to the need for more night training due to the fact that during combat it frequently becomes necessary to conduct night operations. Because we conduct operations at night, it does not mean that we must leave behind our tanks and other weapons that we often use in support. It is difficult to employ armor during darkness and requires considerable training by both the Infantry and the armor personnel. Along with other type combat missions, the Infantryman could learn to attack with tanks at night. As Captain Robert L. Smith wrote, "the attacking force to maintain the momentum gained in daylight operations" may continue the attack at night.(8:66) Captain Smith continued by writing that this "continued maneuver prevents the enemy from reorganizing on newly occupied defensive positions during the night, while maintaining the attacker's advantage of

the initiative." (8:66)

"The use of tanks with Infantry during darkness also achieves a measure of surprise and gains psychological superiority over the enemy." (8:66) Captain Smith added that tanks "might be used at night to seize a limited objective required for the launching of a daylight attack." (8:66)

Some commanders may feel now that the occasion will not arise when they must employ tanks at night, but experiences from our last two wars demonstrate that this is not true. Continental Army Command is fully aware of the necessity of substantial amounts of night training and has directed that all combat units conduct at least thirty-three percent of all tactical training at night. Although this has been CONARC's policy for several years, ATP 7-300 used for training the old Infantry regiment to combat readiness required only eight hours of tank-infantry night training at platoon and company level.

Training Circular 33 was published by Department of the Army on "Combined Arms Units in Atomic Warfare." (10) This circular shows a definite need for training in light of atomic battlefield conditions. After reading this publication it becomes apparent that the majority of our present ATP's are lacking in this field. Of course, many of the ATP's which were designed for units organized under the triangular concept have not yet been rewritten for the pentomic organizations. Perhaps when they are, modifications in this area of consideration will be made. However, until this is accomplished, the ATP's as written and published are the present guides to training within the active army.

Are there many occasions in combat when tanks will be employed with Infantry? The answer to this is quite obvious.